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BRIEF REVIEWS 
DIGEST OF PROCEDURAL STATUTES AND CouRT RuLES: PLEADING, JoINDER, 
AND JuDGMENT REcoRD. By Elizabeth Gaspar Brawn. Ann Arbor: The Over-
beck Company. 1954. Pp. 174. $2. 
This is no bedside reader. One is, I suppose, adequately warned by the 
title to expect something less agreeable than a collection of short stories from the 
New Yorker. Digests are not made to be read seriatim. Lawyers, familiar with 
case digests, know better than to expect anything very stimulating to develop 
from an evening spent in random reading of, say, volume 22 (Mayhem to 
Motions) of the Third Decennial Digest. One is reminded of the man who 
said that the dictionary would be interesting reading if it didn't change the 
subject so often. Well, a digest doesn't change it often enough. 
It comes as something of a surprise, therefore, to find interest in this pioneer 
volume-to find it, in fact, in its novelty and in the vistas which it may open. 
No common lawyer needs to be persuaded of the importance of case digests. 
Only through them can he find the approximate state of the decisions applicable 
to his current problem. In statutory matters, however, and particularly as to 
procedural statutes, he feels little need for a digest of any kind. The statutes 
applicable to his problem usually are fairly evident with textual and annotational 
help. 
Why, then, a digest of statutes, particularly procedural statutes? Primarily 
for two reasons: first, for the proper training of law students. The study of law 
is best undertaken in the context of a "comparative" emphasis. The Ohio lawyer 
is a better lawyer if he knows how Ohio's law stands in comparison with the 
law in the federal courts and in the courts of Michigan and New York and 
Illinois and the other states. Statutory digests make it possible for the student 
to learn rather quickly and accurately what the general legislative treatment of 
a particular problem has been. Yet discussion can be too general, and he should 
pinpoint his own state's position in many of these matters. Here, too, a digest 
of procedural statutes and court rules is useful to inform him as to where his 
own state's formulation fits into the general pattern. 
The second justification for a digest of procedural statutes is the use that 
can be made by individuals and groups interested in legislative reform. Although 
there may be value in proceeding to reform without the prejudice of knowledge 
of what other jurisdictions have done, most successful reform is based upon a 
thoroughgoing understanding of what has been done by other legislatures and 
courts in similar circumstances. This digest makes it possible to know how all 
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other jurisdictions have addressed a given procedural problem at the statute 
and court rule level. The value of such a study for this purpose is plain. 
The procedural matters accumulated in this volume include general rules of 
pleading (e.g., what a statement of claim must include; necessity for reply), 
pleadings in particular actions (e.g., libel and slander; ejectment), general rules 
of joinder (of parties and claims), joinder in particular actions (e.g., foreclosures; 
replevin; partition), and the form and contents of a judgment record. Does 
the reader want to know the statutory ( or rule) pattern with respect to class 
suits? All these are digested on pages 97 and 98, giving both a general picture 
and the specific type in any one jurisdiction. What defenses must be asserted 
affirmatively? About three dozen are listed on pages 31 to 33, with supporting 
lists of states. These samples suggest the kind of thing available in the Digest. 
It should be understood that even as a case digest usually does not alert one 
to applicable statutes, neither does a statutory digest eliminate the necessity of 
looking to judicial interpretation of these same statutes. For example, one does 
not learn by reference to section seven of digest two (''Pleading Specific Per-
formance of Contract") that in California a specific performance plaintiff must 
allege facts indicating not only that there was consideration, but also that it was 
"full and adequate." The reason, of course, is that the principle derives from 
cases, not statutes or court rules. In instances where there appears to have been 
an omission, research discloses that the principle is embodied not in a statute or 
a rule but in decisional law. To the extent that it has been feasible to test 
sections of the Digest in preparation for this review, it appears complete. Em-
ployed for the designed purposes, it will prove a helpful time-saver. 
The task of digesting statutes and rules is a difficult one. Mrs. Brown has 
built on earlier experiments by William Wirt Blume, published in Stason and 
Blume, Cases and Materials on Pleading and Joinder (1948), and the current 
volume was prepared under his supervision. The scheme here employed may 
not prove the ultimate in useful organization. But it is an interesting and 
entirely competent beginning. As legislatures continue to grind out a heavy 
grist of statutes, the importance of classifying, ordering and comparing them 
increases. It is probable that, when statutory digests become more common 
some years or decades hence, the lawyers of that day will look back on this 
landmark work at the University of Michigan as the beginning of the whole 
development. 
After the reB.ections cast in the beginning of this review, it would be unfair 
to conclude without saying that for the serious student of procedure this is an 
interesting book, because it is a gold mine of information about American pro-
cedural statutes and court rules, and because it may be a harbinger of an entirely 
new phase of legal scholarship. 
John W. Reed, 
Professor of Law, 
University of Michigan 
